Files
ResolveSpec/pkg/security/concurrency_test.go
T
Hein 8a94d884e7 fix(security): verify passwords, bind row-security args, fail closed on panic
Verify bcrypt passwords in Direct mode and the shipped procedures, hash on
register/reset, ignore client-supplied roles and level at registration and
drop the password from the jwt_login payload. Legacy cleartext upgrade is
opt-in. Row security templates now bind the user as a parameter, validate
identifiers, attach via common.SelectQuery and fail the request if the
filter cannot be attached. ApplyColumnSecurity and GetRowSecurityTemplate
convert panics to errors and the hooks fail closed. Update audit status.
2026-09-30 13:44:59 +02:00

197 lines
5.6 KiB
Go

package security
import (
"context"
"errors"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"reflect"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/DATA-DOG/go-sqlmock"
)
// slowProvider embeds a nil SecurityProvider; only the two load methods are used.
type slowProvider struct {
SecurityProvider
calls atomic.Int32
active atomic.Int32
maxSeen atomic.Int32
delay time.Duration
}
func (p *slowProvider) enter() {
p.calls.Add(1)
n := p.active.Add(1)
for {
m := p.maxSeen.Load()
if n <= m || p.maxSeen.CompareAndSwap(m, n) {
break
}
}
time.Sleep(p.delay)
p.active.Add(-1)
}
func (p *slowProvider) GetColumnSecurity(ctx context.Context, userID int, schema, table string) ([]ColumnSecurity, error) {
p.enter()
return []ColumnSecurity{{Schema: schema, Tablename: table}}, nil
}
func (p *slowProvider) GetRowSecurity(ctx context.Context, ref any, schema, table string) (RowSecurity, error) {
p.enter()
return RowSecurity{Schema: schema, Tablename: table}, nil
}
func TestLoadDoesNotHoldLockAcrossProvider(t *testing.T) {
p := &slowProvider{delay: 100 * time.Millisecond}
sl, _ := NewSecurityList(p)
var wg sync.WaitGroup
start := time.Now()
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
wg.Add(2)
go func(i int) { defer wg.Done(); _ = sl.LoadColumnSecurity(context.Background(), i, "s", "t", false) }(i)
go func(i int) { defer wg.Done(); _, _ = sl.LoadRowSecurity(context.Background(), i, "s", "t", false) }(i)
}
wg.Wait()
if el := time.Since(start); el > 500*time.Millisecond {
t.Fatalf("loads serialised: %v", el)
}
if p.maxSeen.Load() < 2 {
t.Fatal("provider calls never overlapped")
}
}
func TestLoadCachesAndHonoursOverwrite(t *testing.T) {
p := &slowProvider{}
sl, _ := NewSecurityList(p)
ctx := context.Background()
for i := 0; i < 3; i++ {
_ = sl.LoadColumnSecurity(ctx, 1, "s", "t", false)
_, _ = sl.LoadRowSecurity(ctx, 1, "s", "t", false)
}
if got := p.calls.Load(); got != 2 {
t.Fatalf("expected 2 provider calls (cached), got %d", got)
}
_ = sl.LoadColumnSecurity(ctx, 1, "s", "t", true)
_, _ = sl.LoadRowSecurity(ctx, 1, "s", "t", true)
if got := p.calls.Load(); got != 4 {
t.Fatalf("overwrite should reload: got %d calls", got)
}
}
func TestLoadExpiryAndPrune(t *testing.T) {
p := &slowProvider{}
sl, _ := NewSecurityList(p)
ctx := context.Background()
_ = sl.LoadColumnSecurity(ctx, 1, "s", "t", false)
sl.ColumnSecurityMutex.Lock()
sl.colSecExpiry["s.t@1"] = time.Now().Add(-time.Second)
sl.ColumnSecurityMutex.Unlock()
_ = sl.LoadColumnSecurity(ctx, 1, "s", "t", false)
if p.calls.Load() != 2 {
t.Fatal("expired entry should reload")
}
sl.ColumnSecurityMutex.Lock()
sl.colSecExpiry["s.old@9"] = time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)
sl.ColumnSecurity["s.old@9"] = nil
sl.lastColPrune = time.Time{}
sl.ColumnSecurityMutex.Unlock()
_ = sl.LoadColumnSecurity(ctx, 2, "s", "t", false)
sl.ColumnSecurityMutex.RLock()
_, ok := sl.ColumnSecurity["s.old@9"]
sl.ColumnSecurityMutex.RUnlock()
if ok {
t.Fatal("stale entry not pruned")
}
}
func TestAuthenticateRejectsTooManyTokens(t *testing.T) {
db, _, err := sqlmock.New()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer db.Close()
a := NewDatabaseAuthenticator(db)
r := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/", nil)
r.Header.Set("Authorization", "a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h")
if _, err := a.Authenticate(r); err == nil || err.Error() != "too many authorization tokens" {
t.Fatalf("got %v", err)
}
}
func TestOAuth2CleanupStopsOnClose(t *testing.T) {
db, _, _ := sqlmock.New()
defer db.Close()
a := NewDatabaseAuthenticator(db).WithOAuth2(OAuth2Config{ClientID: "x", ProviderName: "p"})
p := a.oauth2Providers["p"]
if err := a.Close(); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
_ = a.Close() // idempotent
select {
case <-p.stopCh:
default:
t.Fatal("stop channel not closed")
}
}
func TestSplitTagDropsEmpty(t *testing.T) {
got := splitTag("a,,b,c,", ',')
if len(got) != 3 || got[0] != "a" || got[2] != "c" {
t.Fatalf("got %v", got)
}
}
func TestColumnSecurityPanicFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
type Rec struct {
JSONCol string `json:"json_col" bun:"json_col"`
}
sl, _ := NewSecurityList(&slowProvider{})
sl.ColumnSecurity["public.t@1"] = []ColumnSecurity{{
Schema: "public", Tablename: "t", Path: []string{"JSONCol"}, Accesstype: "mask", UserID: 1,
}}
// A struct boxed in an interface is not addressable, so SetString panics.
recs := []any{Rec{JSONCol: "secret"}}
out, err := sl.ApplyColumnSecurity(reflect.ValueOf(recs), reflect.TypeOf(Rec{}), 1, "public", "t")
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("panic must be returned as an error, got out=%v", out)
}
if errors.Is(err, ErrNoColumnSecurity) {
t.Fatal("a panic must not look like 'no rules'")
}
}
func TestNoRulesIsNotAnError(t *testing.T) {
sl, _ := NewSecurityList(&slowProvider{})
if _, err := sl.GetRowSecurityTemplate(1, "s", "t"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoRowSecurity) {
t.Fatalf("got %v", err)
}
if _, err := sl.ApplyColumnSecurity(reflect.ValueOf([]int{}), reflect.TypeOf(0), 1, "s", "t"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNoColumnSecurity) {
t.Fatalf("got %v", err)
}
}
func TestApplyColumnSecurityHookFailsClosedOnPanic(t *testing.T) {
type Rec struct {
JSONCol string `bun:"json_col"`
}
sl, _ := NewSecurityList(&slowProvider{})
sl.ColumnSecurity["public.t@1"] = []ColumnSecurity{{
Schema: "public", Tablename: "t", Path: []string{"JSONCol"}, Accesstype: "mask", UserID: 1,
}}
secCtx := &mockSecurityContext{
ctx: context.Background(), userID: 1, hasUser: true, schema: "public", entity: "t",
model: &Rec{}, result: []any{Rec{JSONCol: "secret"}},
}
if err := ApplyColumnSecurity(secCtx, sl); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a panic during masking must fail the request, not return unmasked data")
}
}