chore: ⬆️ updated deps

This commit is contained in:
2026-05-20 22:52:20 +02:00
parent d9f27c1775
commit 43f4680176
374 changed files with 295527 additions and 301467 deletions
+67
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@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
package pgconn
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgproto3"
)
func (c *PgConn) oauthAuth(ctx context.Context) error {
if c.config.OAuthTokenProvider == nil {
return errors.New("OAuth authentication required but no token provider configured")
}
token, err := c.config.OAuthTokenProvider(ctx)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to obtain OAuth token: %w", err)
}
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7628.html#section-3.1
initialResponse := []byte("n,,\x01auth=Bearer " + token + "\x01\x01")
saslInitialResponse := &pgproto3.SASLInitialResponse{
AuthMechanism: "OAUTHBEARER",
Data: initialResponse,
}
c.frontend.Send(saslInitialResponse)
err = c.flushWithPotentialWriteReadDeadlock()
if err != nil {
return err
}
msg, err := c.receiveMessage()
if err != nil {
return err
}
switch m := msg.(type) {
case *pgproto3.AuthenticationOk:
return nil
case *pgproto3.AuthenticationSASLContinue:
// Server sent error response in SASL continue
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7628.html#section-3.2.2
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7628.html#section-3.2.3
errResponse := struct {
Status string `json:"status"`
Scope string `json:"scope"`
OpenIDConfiguration string `json:"openid-configuration"`
}{}
err := json.Unmarshal(m.Data, &errResponse)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid OAuth error response from server: %w", err)
}
// Per RFC 7628 section 3.2.3, we should send a SASLResponse which only contains \x01.
// However, since the connection will be closed anyway, we can skip this
return fmt.Errorf("OAuth authentication failed: %s", errResponse.Status)
case *pgproto3.ErrorResponse:
return ErrorResponseToPgError(m)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected message type during OAuth auth: %T", msg)
}
}
+148 -21
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@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
// SCRAM-SHA-256 authentication
// SCRAM-SHA-256 and SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS authentication
//
// Resources:
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5929
// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8265
// https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/sasl-authentication.html
//
@@ -15,19 +16,28 @@ package pgconn
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/hmac"
"crypto/pbkdf2"
"crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/sha512"
"crypto/tls"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/base64"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"slices"
"strconv"
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgproto3"
"golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2"
"golang.org/x/text/secure/precis"
)
const clientNonceLen = 18
const (
clientNonceLen = 18
scramSHA256Name = "SCRAM-SHA-256"
scramSHA256PlusName = "SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS"
)
// Perform SCRAM authentication.
func (c *PgConn) scramAuth(serverAuthMechanisms []string) error {
@@ -36,9 +46,35 @@ func (c *PgConn) scramAuth(serverAuthMechanisms []string) error {
return err
}
serverHasPlus := slices.Contains(sc.serverAuthMechanisms, scramSHA256PlusName)
if c.config.ChannelBinding == "require" && !serverHasPlus {
return errors.New("channel binding required but server does not support SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS")
}
// If we have a TLS connection and channel binding is not disabled, attempt to
// extract the server certificate hash for tls-server-end-point channel binding.
if tlsConn, ok := c.conn.(*tls.Conn); ok && c.config.ChannelBinding != "disable" {
certHash, err := getTLSCertificateHash(tlsConn)
if err != nil && c.config.ChannelBinding == "require" {
return fmt.Errorf("channel binding required but failed to get server certificate hash: %w", err)
}
// Upgrade to SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS if we have binding data and the server supports it.
if certHash != nil && serverHasPlus {
sc.authMechanism = scramSHA256PlusName
}
sc.channelBindingData = certHash
sc.hasTLS = true
}
if c.config.ChannelBinding == "require" && sc.channelBindingData == nil {
return errors.New("channel binding required but channel binding data is not available")
}
// Send client-first-message in a SASLInitialResponse
saslInitialResponse := &pgproto3.SASLInitialResponse{
AuthMechanism: "SCRAM-SHA-256",
AuthMechanism: sc.authMechanism,
Data: sc.clientFirstMessage(),
}
c.frontend.Send(saslInitialResponse)
@@ -107,10 +143,31 @@ func (c *PgConn) rxSASLFinal() (*pgproto3.AuthenticationSASLFinal, error) {
type scramClient struct {
serverAuthMechanisms []string
password []byte
password string
clientNonce []byte
// authMechanism is the selected SASL mechanism for the client. Must be
// either SCRAM-SHA-256 (default) or SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS.
//
// Upgraded to SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS during authentication when channel binding
// is not disabled, channel binding data is available (TLS connection with
// an obtainable server certificate hash) and the server advertises
// SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS.
authMechanism string
// hasTLS indicates whether the connection is using TLS. This is
// needed because the GS2 header must distinguish between a client that
// supports channel binding but the server does not ("y,,") versus one
// that does not support it at all ("n,,").
hasTLS bool
// channelBindingData is the hash of the server's TLS certificate, computed
// per the tls-server-end-point channel binding type (RFC 5929). Used as
// the binding input in SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS. nil when not in use.
channelBindingData []byte
clientFirstMessageBare []byte
clientGS2Header []byte
serverFirstMessage []byte
clientAndServerNonce []byte
@@ -124,26 +181,23 @@ type scramClient struct {
func newScramClient(serverAuthMechanisms []string, password string) (*scramClient, error) {
sc := &scramClient{
serverAuthMechanisms: serverAuthMechanisms,
authMechanism: scramSHA256Name,
}
// Ensure server supports SCRAM-SHA-256
hasScramSHA256 := false
for _, mech := range sc.serverAuthMechanisms {
if mech == "SCRAM-SHA-256" {
hasScramSHA256 = true
break
}
}
if !hasScramSHA256 {
// Ensure the server supports SCRAM-SHA-256. SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS is the
// channel binding variant and is only advertised when the server supports
// SSL. PostgreSQL always advertises the base SCRAM-SHA-256 mechanism
// regardless of SSL.
if !slices.Contains(sc.serverAuthMechanisms, scramSHA256Name) {
return nil, errors.New("server does not support SCRAM-SHA-256")
}
// precis.OpaqueString is equivalent to SASLprep for password.
var err error
sc.password, err = precis.OpaqueString.Bytes([]byte(password))
sc.password, err = precis.OpaqueString.String(password)
if err != nil {
// PostgreSQL allows passwords invalid according to SCRAM / SASLprep.
sc.password = []byte(password)
sc.password = password
}
buf := make([]byte, clientNonceLen)
@@ -158,8 +212,32 @@ func newScramClient(serverAuthMechanisms []string, password string) (*scramClien
}
func (sc *scramClient) clientFirstMessage() []byte {
sc.clientFirstMessageBare = []byte(fmt.Sprintf("n=,r=%s", sc.clientNonce))
return []byte(fmt.Sprintf("n,,%s", sc.clientFirstMessageBare))
// The client-first-message is the GS2 header concatenated with the bare
// message (username + client nonce). The GS2 header communicates the
// client's channel binding capability to the server:
//
// "n,," - client is not using TLS (channel binding not possible)
// "y,," - client is using TLS but channel binding is not
// in use (e.g., server did not advertise SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS
// or the server certificate hash was not obtainable)
// "p=tls-server-end-point,," - channel binding is active via SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS
//
// See:
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5802#section-6
// https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5929#section-4
// https://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/sasl-authentication.html#SASL-SCRAM-SHA-256
sc.clientFirstMessageBare = fmt.Appendf(nil, "n=,r=%s", sc.clientNonce)
if sc.authMechanism == scramSHA256PlusName {
sc.clientGS2Header = []byte("p=tls-server-end-point,,")
} else if sc.hasTLS {
sc.clientGS2Header = []byte("y,,")
} else {
sc.clientGS2Header = []byte("n,,")
}
return append(sc.clientGS2Header, sc.clientFirstMessageBare...)
}
func (sc *scramClient) recvServerFirstMessage(serverFirstMessage []byte) error {
@@ -218,9 +296,25 @@ func (sc *scramClient) recvServerFirstMessage(serverFirstMessage []byte) error {
}
func (sc *scramClient) clientFinalMessage() string {
clientFinalMessageWithoutProof := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("c=biws,r=%s", sc.clientAndServerNonce))
// The c= attribute carries the base64-encoded channel binding input.
//
// Without channel binding this is just the GS2 header alone ("biws" for
// "n,," or "eSws" for "y,,").
//
// With channel binding, this is the GS2 header with the channel binding data
// (certificate hash) appended.
channelBindInput := sc.clientGS2Header
if sc.authMechanism == scramSHA256PlusName {
channelBindInput = slices.Concat(sc.clientGS2Header, sc.channelBindingData)
}
channelBindingEncoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(channelBindInput)
clientFinalMessageWithoutProof := fmt.Appendf(nil, "c=%s,r=%s", channelBindingEncoded, sc.clientAndServerNonce)
sc.saltedPassword = pbkdf2.Key([]byte(sc.password), sc.salt, sc.iterations, 32, sha256.New)
var err error
sc.saltedPassword, err = pbkdf2.Key(sha256.New, sc.password, sc.salt, sc.iterations, 32)
if err != nil {
panic(err) // This should never happen.
}
sc.authMessage = bytes.Join([][]byte{sc.clientFirstMessageBare, sc.serverFirstMessage, clientFinalMessageWithoutProof}, []byte(","))
clientProof := computeClientProof(sc.saltedPassword, sc.authMessage)
@@ -254,7 +348,7 @@ func computeClientProof(saltedPassword, authMessage []byte) []byte {
clientSignature := computeHMAC(storedKey[:], authMessage)
clientProof := make([]byte, len(clientSignature))
for i := 0; i < len(clientSignature); i++ {
for i := range clientSignature {
clientProof[i] = clientKey[i] ^ clientSignature[i]
}
@@ -270,3 +364,36 @@ func computeServerSignature(saltedPassword, authMessage []byte) []byte {
base64.StdEncoding.Encode(buf, serverSignature)
return buf
}
// Get the server certificate hash for SCRAM channel binding type
// tls-server-end-point.
func getTLSCertificateHash(conn *tls.Conn) ([]byte, error) {
state := conn.ConnectionState()
if len(state.PeerCertificates) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("no peer certificates for channel binding")
}
cert := state.PeerCertificates[0]
// Per RFC 5929 section 4.1: If the certificate's signatureAlgorithm uses
// MD5 or SHA-1, use SHA-256. Otherwise use the hash from the signature
// algorithm.
//
// See: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5929.html#section-4.1
var h hash.Hash
switch cert.SignatureAlgorithm {
case x509.MD5WithRSA, x509.SHA1WithRSA, x509.ECDSAWithSHA1:
h = sha256.New()
case x509.SHA256WithRSA, x509.SHA256WithRSAPSS, x509.ECDSAWithSHA256:
h = sha256.New()
case x509.SHA384WithRSA, x509.SHA384WithRSAPSS, x509.ECDSAWithSHA384:
h = sha512.New384()
case x509.SHA512WithRSA, x509.SHA512WithRSAPSS, x509.ECDSAWithSHA512:
h = sha512.New()
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("tls-server-end-point channel binding is undefined for certificate signature algorithm %v", cert.SignatureAlgorithm)
}
h.Write(cert.Raw)
return h.Sum(nil), nil
}
+100 -10
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@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"maps"
"math"
"net"
"net/url"
@@ -55,6 +56,13 @@ type Config struct {
SSLNegotiation string // sslnegotiation=postgres or sslnegotiation=direct
// AfterNetConnect is called after the network connection, including TLS if applicable, is established but before any
// PostgreSQL protocol communication. It takes the established net.Conn and returns a net.Conn that will be used in
// its place. It can be used to wrap the net.Conn (e.g. for logging, diagnostics, or testing). Its functionality has
// some overlap with DialFunc. However, DialFunc takes place before TLS is established and cannot be used to control
// the final net.Conn used for PostgreSQL protocol communication while AfterNetConnect can.
AfterNetConnect func(ctx context.Context, config *Config, conn net.Conn) (net.Conn, error)
// ValidateConnect is called during a connection attempt after a successful authentication with the PostgreSQL server.
// It can be used to validate that the server is acceptable. If this returns an error the connection is closed and the next
// fallback config is tried. This allows implementing high availability behavior such as libpq does with target_session_attrs.
@@ -75,6 +83,23 @@ type Config struct {
// that you close on FATAL errors by returning false.
OnPgError PgErrorHandler
// OAuthTokenProvider is a function that returns an OAuth token for authentication. If set, it will be used for
// OAUTHBEARER SASL authentication when the server requests it.
OAuthTokenProvider func(context.Context) (string, error)
// MinProtocolVersion is the minimum acceptable PostgreSQL protocol version.
// If the server does not support at least this version, the connection will fail.
// Valid values: "3.0", "3.2", "latest". Defaults to "3.0".
MinProtocolVersion string
// MaxProtocolVersion is the maximum PostgreSQL protocol version to request from the server.
// Valid values: "3.0", "3.2", "latest". Defaults to "3.0" for compatibility.
MaxProtocolVersion string
// ChannelBinding is the channel_binding parameter for SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS authentication.
// Valid values: "disable", "prefer", "require". Defaults to "prefer".
ChannelBinding string
createdByParseConfig bool // Used to enforce created by ParseConfig rule.
}
@@ -96,9 +121,7 @@ func (c *Config) Copy() *Config {
}
if newConf.RuntimeParams != nil {
newConf.RuntimeParams = make(map[string]string, len(c.RuntimeParams))
for k, v := range c.RuntimeParams {
newConf.RuntimeParams[k] = v
}
maps.Copy(newConf.RuntimeParams, c.RuntimeParams)
}
if newConf.Fallbacks != nil {
newConf.Fallbacks = make([]*FallbackConfig, len(c.Fallbacks))
@@ -207,6 +230,8 @@ func NetworkAddress(host string, port uint16) (network, address string) {
// PGCONNECT_TIMEOUT
// PGTARGETSESSIONATTRS
// PGTZ
// PGMINPROTOCOLVERSION
// PGMAXPROTOCOLVERSION
//
// See http://www.postgresql.org/docs/current/static/libpq-envars.html for details on the meaning of environment variables.
//
@@ -332,6 +357,9 @@ func ParseConfigWithOptions(connString string, options ParseConfigOptions) (*Con
"target_session_attrs": {},
"service": {},
"servicefile": {},
"min_protocol_version": {},
"max_protocol_version": {},
"channel_binding": {},
}
// Adding kerberos configuration
@@ -424,6 +452,52 @@ func ParseConfigWithOptions(connString string, options ParseConfigOptions) (*Con
return nil, &ParseConfigError{ConnString: connString, msg: fmt.Sprintf("unknown target_session_attrs value: %v", tsa)}
}
minProto, err := parseProtocolVersion(settings["min_protocol_version"])
if err != nil {
return nil, &ParseConfigError{ConnString: connString, msg: fmt.Sprintf("invalid min_protocol_version: %q", settings["min_protocol_version"]), err: err}
}
maxProto, err := parseProtocolVersion(settings["max_protocol_version"])
if err != nil {
return nil, &ParseConfigError{ConnString: connString, msg: fmt.Sprintf("invalid max_protocol_version: %q", settings["max_protocol_version"]), err: err}
}
config.MinProtocolVersion = settings["min_protocol_version"]
config.MaxProtocolVersion = settings["max_protocol_version"]
if config.MinProtocolVersion == "" {
config.MinProtocolVersion = "3.0"
}
// When max_protocol_version is not explicitly set, default based on
// min_protocol_version. This matches libpq behavior: if min > 3.0,
// default max to latest; otherwise default to 3.0 for compatibility
// with older servers/poolers that don't support NegotiateProtocolVersion.
if config.MaxProtocolVersion == "" {
if minProto > pgproto3.ProtocolVersion30 {
config.MaxProtocolVersion = "latest"
} else {
config.MaxProtocolVersion = "3.0"
}
}
// Only error when max_protocol_version was explicitly set and conflicts
// with min_protocol_version. When max_protocol_version is not explicitly
// set, the auto-raise logic above already ensures a valid default.
if minProto > maxProto && settings["max_protocol_version"] != "" {
return nil, &ParseConfigError{ConnString: connString, msg: "min_protocol_version cannot be greater than max_protocol_version"}
}
switch channelBinding := settings["channel_binding"]; channelBinding {
case "", "prefer":
config.ChannelBinding = "prefer"
case "disable":
config.ChannelBinding = "disable"
case "require":
config.ChannelBinding = "require"
default:
return nil, &ParseConfigError{ConnString: connString, msg: fmt.Sprintf("unknown channel_binding value: %v", channelBinding)}
}
return config, nil
}
@@ -431,9 +505,7 @@ func mergeSettings(settingSets ...map[string]string) map[string]string {
settings := make(map[string]string)
for _, s2 := range settingSets {
for k, v := range s2 {
settings[k] = v
}
maps.Copy(settings, s2)
}
return settings
@@ -463,6 +535,8 @@ func parseEnvSettings() map[string]string {
"PGSERVICEFILE": "servicefile",
"PGTZ": "timezone",
"PGOPTIONS": "options",
"PGMINPROTOCOLVERSION": "min_protocol_version",
"PGMAXPROTOCOLVERSION": "max_protocol_version",
}
for envname, realname := range nameMap {
@@ -487,7 +561,9 @@ func parseURLSettings(connString string) (map[string]string, error) {
}
if parsedURL.User != nil {
settings["user"] = parsedURL.User.Username()
if u := parsedURL.User.Username(); u != "" {
settings["user"] = u
}
if password, present := parsedURL.User.Password(); present {
settings["password"] = password
}
@@ -496,7 +572,7 @@ func parseURLSettings(connString string) (map[string]string, error) {
// Handle multiple host:port's in url.Host by splitting them into host,host,host and port,port,port.
var hosts []string
var ports []string
for _, host := range strings.Split(parsedURL.Host, ",") {
for host := range strings.SplitSeq(parsedURL.Host, ",") {
if host == "" {
continue
}
@@ -614,6 +690,9 @@ func parseKeywordValueSettings(s string) (map[string]string, error) {
return nil, errors.New("invalid keyword/value")
}
if key == "user" && val == "" {
continue
}
settings[key] = val
}
@@ -784,7 +863,7 @@ func configTLS(settings map[string]string, thisHost string, parseConfigOptions P
// Attempt decryption with pass phrase
// NOTE: only supports RSA (PKCS#1)
if sslpassword != "" {
decryptedKey, decryptedError = x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, []byte(sslpassword))
decryptedKey, decryptedError = x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, []byte(sslpassword)) //nolint:ineffassign
}
// if sslpassword not provided or has decryption error when use it
// try to find sslpassword with callback function
@@ -799,7 +878,7 @@ func configTLS(settings map[string]string, thisHost string, parseConfigOptions P
decryptedKey, decryptedError = x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, []byte(sslpassword))
// Should we also provide warning for PKCS#1 needed?
if decryptedError != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to decrypt key: %w", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to decrypt key: %w", decryptedError)
}
pemBytes := pem.Block{
@@ -951,3 +1030,14 @@ func ValidateConnectTargetSessionAttrsPreferStandby(ctx context.Context, pgConn
return nil
}
func parseProtocolVersion(s string) (uint32, error) {
switch s {
case "", "3.0":
return pgproto3.ProtocolVersion30, nil
case "3.2", "latest":
return pgproto3.ProtocolVersion32, nil
default:
return 0, fmt.Errorf("invalid protocol version: %q", s)
}
}
+19 -27
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@@ -8,12 +8,13 @@ import (
// ContextWatcher watches a context and performs an action when the context is canceled. It can watch one context at a
// time.
type ContextWatcher struct {
handler Handler
unwatchChan chan struct{}
handler Handler
lock sync.Mutex
watchInProgress bool
onCancelWasCalled bool
// Lock protects the members below.
lock sync.Mutex
// Stop is the handle for an "after func". See [context.AfterFunc].
stop func() bool
done chan struct{}
}
// NewContextWatcher returns a ContextWatcher. onCancel will be called when a watched context is canceled.
@@ -21,8 +22,7 @@ type ContextWatcher struct {
// onCancel called.
func NewContextWatcher(handler Handler) *ContextWatcher {
cw := &ContextWatcher{
handler: handler,
unwatchChan: make(chan struct{}),
handler: handler,
}
return cw
@@ -33,25 +33,16 @@ func (cw *ContextWatcher) Watch(ctx context.Context) {
cw.lock.Lock()
defer cw.lock.Unlock()
if cw.watchInProgress {
panic("Watch already in progress")
if cw.stop != nil {
panic("watch already in progress")
}
cw.onCancelWasCalled = false
if ctx.Done() != nil {
cw.watchInProgress = true
go func() {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
cw.handler.HandleCancel(ctx)
cw.onCancelWasCalled = true
<-cw.unwatchChan
case <-cw.unwatchChan:
}
}()
} else {
cw.watchInProgress = false
cw.done = make(chan struct{})
cw.stop = context.AfterFunc(ctx, func() {
cw.handler.HandleCancel(ctx)
close(cw.done)
})
}
}
@@ -61,12 +52,13 @@ func (cw *ContextWatcher) Unwatch() {
cw.lock.Lock()
defer cw.lock.Unlock()
if cw.watchInProgress {
cw.unwatchChan <- struct{}{}
if cw.onCancelWasCalled {
if cw.stop != nil {
if !cw.stop() {
<-cw.done
cw.handler.HandleUnwatchAfterCancel()
}
cw.watchInProgress = false
cw.stop = nil
cw.done = nil
}
}
+17
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@@ -254,3 +254,20 @@ func (e *NotPreferredError) SafeToRetry() bool {
func (e *NotPreferredError) Unwrap() error {
return e.err
}
type PrepareError struct {
err error
ParseComplete bool // Indicates whether the error occurred after a ParseComplete message was received.
}
func (e *PrepareError) Error() string {
if e.ParseComplete {
return fmt.Sprintf("prepare failed after ParseComplete: %s", e.err.Error())
}
return e.err.Error()
}
func (e *PrepareError) Unwrap() error {
return e.err
}
+618 -150
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