mirror of
https://github.com/bitechdev/ResolveSpec.git
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Hein
640faeeeaf
Authorization server: consent and scopes, OIDC (nonce, auth_time, acr, sid, at_hash, signed userinfo, RP-initiated and back-channel logout), managed refresh tokens with rotation and reuse detection, RFC 9068 JWT access tokens, DPoP, PAR, device grant, token exchange, private_key_jwt, RFC 7591/7592 registration, RFC 9207 iss, signing keyring with rotation. State is DB-backed through a new lookup.OAuthGrantStore (procedure and direct backends, four dialect DDLs, conformance cases). Client side: WithOIDC discovery, PKCE, nonce, id_token validation, OAuth2LogoutURL. PeekRefresh now returns already rotated tokens so RotateRefresh can detect reuse. Docs: OAUTH2_SERVER.md, oauth2_full_example.go, breaking_changes.md step 8.
107 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
107 lines
2.8 KiB
Go
package security
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import (
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"crypto/sha256"
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"crypto/subtle"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
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)
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// dpopProof is a validated RFC 9449 proof.
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type dpopProof struct {
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JKT string // base64url SHA-256 thumbprint of the proof key
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}
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// verifyDPoP validates the DPoP header of r. It returns (nil, nil) when the request has none.
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// accessToken, when non-empty, is the token the proof must be bound to (the "ath" claim).
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func (s *OAuthServer) verifyDPoP(r *http.Request, accessToken string) (*dpopProof, *oauthError) {
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vals := r.Header.Values("DPoP")
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if len(vals) == 0 {
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return nil, nil
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}
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bad := func(desc string) (*dpopProof, *oauthError) {
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return nil, oerr("invalid_dpop_proof", desc, http.StatusBadRequest)
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}
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if !s.cfg.EnableDPoP {
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return bad("DPoP is not enabled")
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}
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if len(vals) != 1 {
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return bad("exactly one DPoP header is required")
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}
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var jkt string
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claims := &struct {
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jwt.RegisteredClaims
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HTM string `json:"htm"`
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HTU string `json:"htu"`
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ATH string `json:"ath"`
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}{}
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tok, err := jwt.NewParser(jwt.WithValidMethods([]string{"ES256", "ES384", "RS256", "PS256"})).
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ParseWithClaims(vals[0], claims, func(t *jwt.Token) (any, error) {
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if t.Header["typ"] != "dpop+jwt" {
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return nil, jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable
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}
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m, ok := t.Header["jwk"].(map[string]any)
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if !ok {
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return nil, jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable
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}
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if _, private := m["d"]; private {
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return nil, jwt.ErrTokenUnverifiable
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}
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pub, err := publicFromJWK(m)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if jkt, err = jwkThumbprint(pub); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return pub, nil
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})
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if err != nil || !tok.Valid {
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return bad("proof signature or header invalid")
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}
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if claims.HTM != r.Method {
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return bad("htm does not match the request method")
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}
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if !sameURLNoQuery(claims.HTU, s.requestURL(r)) {
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return bad("htu does not match the request URL")
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}
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if claims.IssuedAt == nil || claims.ID == "" {
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return bad("iat and jti are required")
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}
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iat := claims.IssuedAt.Time
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if d := time.Since(iat); d > 2*time.Minute || d < -time.Minute {
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return bad("proof is not fresh")
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}
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if accessToken != "" {
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sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(accessToken))
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if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare([]byte(b64u(sum[:])), []byte(claims.ATH)) != 1 {
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return bad("ath does not match the access token")
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}
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}
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seen, err := s.replayed(r.Context(), "dpop:"+jkt+":"+claims.ID, iat.Add(3*time.Minute))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, serverErr()
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}
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if seen {
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return bad("proof replayed")
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}
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return &dpopProof{JKT: jkt}, nil
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}
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func sameURLNoQuery(a, b string) bool {
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ua, err1 := url.Parse(a)
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ub, err2 := url.Parse(b)
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if err1 != nil || err2 != nil {
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return false
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}
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norm := func(u *url.URL) string {
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return strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) + "://" + strings.ToLower(u.Host) + u.EscapedPath()
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}
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return norm(ua) == norm(ub)
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}
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